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Abstract   Gallipoli continues to be a cause célèbre for those seeking to assign 
blame for this ill-fated military campaign fought against the Ottoman Empire from 
April to December 1915. Variously blamed are weak generals, poor planning and 
preparation – and even inadequate topographical mapping. Intended to assist the 
Allied naval fleet in breaking through the Dardanelles Straits, thereby threatening 
the Ottoman Capital of Constantinople (and, it was hoped, forcing the Ottomans 
out of the war), the military campaign was certainly hastily conceived and under-
resourced. Commencing on 25 April 1915 as an amphibious landing, the cam-
paign soon degenerated into a desperate struggle, as the Allies attempted in vain to 
break out of tightly constrained beachheads. This study investigates the role of ter-
rain in the warfare of the ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) 
Sector, from initial landings in April, to attempted breakout in August. At 
ANZAC, an ‘unfortunate accident of geography’ brought, dry, mostly fine-grained 
Pliocene sediments to the coast. An upland area created by the North Anatolian 
Fault System, the fine sediments were (and are) quickly weathered and eroded to 
form topographically complex gullied surfaces. This would be the almost hopeless 
battleground of the Australians and New Zealanders in April–December 1915. 
With the Ottomans holding a firm grip on the ridge top, the ANZAC troops were 
constrained to a small, deeply dissected and mostly waterless sector of the scarp 
slope of the Sari Bair Plateau and ridge system. The war here would be hard 
fought and bloody, with geology having a major impact on its outcome; the with-
drawal of ANZAC troops in December 1915. 
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Introduction 
The Dardanelles, a narrow passageway between European and Asian Turkey, is a 
tightly-constrained waterway that was created by movement along the still seismi-
cally-active North Anatolian Fault system. This strategic waterway connects the 
Aegean Sea and Mediterranean with the Sea of Marmara and ultimately, through 
the Bosphorous, to the Black Sea, and has been a point of military interest for cen-
turies. In European Turkey, the shores of the Dardanelles are guarded by the Gal-
lipoli Peninsula, a narrow finger of land named after its principal settlement (Geli-
bolu, or Gallipoli). Opposing this is the Asiatic shore, the Aegean expression of 
the great Anatolian Peninsula, the greater part of modern Turkey, and the heart of 
the ailing Ottoman Empire in 1915.  
Constantinople, (now the modern city of Istanbul), sits astride the Bosphorous 
and guards the entrance to the Black Sea, thereby controlling entry to the winter 
ports of Russia. The city had been coveted for centuries, particularly by the old 
enemies of Greece and Russia. With the Ottoman Empire finally committed to the 
Central Powers late in 1914, the sights of the Allies turned once again to the Dar-
danelles and Constantinople, with the hope that the Ottomans could be persuaded 
by a show of arms to retreat from their alliance, and sue for peace – thereby allow-
ing Russia to be supplied from the south through the Dardanelles and Bosphorous, 
and on to the Black Sea. That show of arms was to be by an Anglo-French naval 
demonstration, with out-dated ships pitted against the fortresses of the Darda-
nelles, the intention being for these naval vessels to press on regardless, and ap-
pear off the Golden Horn in Constantinople – thereby, it was hoped, forcing the 
hand of the Ottomans (Aspinall-Oglander 1929). Long-fortified, the idea of 
squeezing a fleet of ships between the beetling brows of the shores of the Darda-
nelles had exercised the mind of the military of many nations for centuries, partic-
ularly so in the complex diplomacies of two centuries before the Great War. 
Arguably doomed to failure from its inception, the Naval Campaign began on 
19 February and was abandoned just under a month later, on 18 March 1915, part-
ly a result of the severe loss of men and capital ships to minefields. The next phase 
was the invasion of the Peninsula, with the sole purpose of removing enemy mine-
fields and shore batteries, thereby allowing the ships once again to pass through 
the straits. It was not intended, however, that ground forces would press on to cap-
ture Constantinople; that would still be left to the Navy (Aspinall-Oglander 1929; 
Rhodes James 1965; Travers 2001; Carlyon 2003; Prior 2009; Doyle 2011). Thus, 
on 25 April 1915, landings were made on several of the beaches at Gallipoli in 
two main sectors: Cape Helles at the tip of the Peninsula, scene of the landings of 
the British 29th Division, (most recently discussed by Doyle 2008), and farther up 
the coast, in the ‘badland’ topography of what became known as the ANZAC sec-
tor (Fig. 1.1), named after the Australian & New Zealand Army Corps that landed 
there.  
 
Fig. 1.1  The potential landing sites at Gallipoli; the landings were planned to ‘silence the guns’ 
and permit the removal of the Ottoman minefields, so hazardous to the passage of the Allied 
ships. Landings made on 25 April are indicated by the main arrows. (Based on illustration in 
Doyle and Bennett 1999).  
 
For all the attention focused upon the ANZAC Sector (e.g., see Rhodes James 
1965; Travers 2001; Carlyon 2003; Prior 2009; Crawley 2014 and books therein), 
there have been few detailed studies of the military geography of this important 
part of the Gallipoli battlefield. Some aspects of its military geology have been 
discussed by Doyle & Bennett (1999, 2002), and the topographical intelligence 
gathered for the landings has been described by Chasseaud & Doyle (2004).  This 
paper examines the role of terrain in the warfare of the ANZAC Sector, from ini-
tial landings in April, to the development of trench warfare. At ANZAC, what 
might be termed an ‘unfortunate accident of geography’ brought, dry, mostly fine-
grained Pliocene sediments to the coast, the only location upon the Peninsula 
where this is the case. An upland area due to the North Anatolian Fault System, 
the fine sediments were (and are) quickly weathered and eroded to form topo-
graphically complex gullied surfaces. This created an almost hopeless battle-
ground for Australians and New Zealanders during the latter part of 1915. With 
the Ottomans holding a firm grip on the ridge top, ANZAC troops were con-
strained to a small, deeply dissected and mostly waterless sector of the scarp slope 
of the Sari Bair Plateau and ridge system. The war here would be hard fought and 
bloody, with the local geology having a major impact on its outcome. 
Campaign summary 
The land-based Gallipoli campaign was planned originally for 23 April 1915, fol-
lowing the failure of the naval engagement, and concerns over the continued loss 
of ships and naval personnel. Troops intended for the landings were drawn from 
Britain (29th and Royal Naval divisions), Australia, New Zealand (Australian and 
Zealand Army Corps: ANZAC), and France (Corps Expéditionnaire d'Orient), 
gathered together on the Greek islands of Lemnos and Imbros under the overall 
command of General Sir Ian Hamilton. 
It was understood by both sides that there were a limited number of locations, a 
factor that is typical of all amphibious operations (Galgano 2005), determined 
largely by the disposition of major terrain elements, where a landing could be suc-
cessfully executed: (1) in the northern part of the Peninsula near Bulair, the nar-
rowest part of the isthmus connecting Gallipoli with the rest of Thrace; (2) on the 
Aegean coast of Anatolia—known in contemporary accounts as the Asiatic 
shore—notably at Kum Kale at the entrance to the Dardanelles; (3) on either side 
of the promontory known as Gaba Tepe, in a depression separating the two main 
massifs of the southern peninsula; (4) at the narrow beaches of Cape Helles, 
threatening the southern slopes of the Kilid Bahr Plateau; and (5) at Suvla Bay 
(Fig. 1.1;  Nevinson 1920; Aspinall-Oglander 1929; Callwell 1929; Rhodes James 
1965; Travers 2001; Chasseaud & Doyle 2004; Prior 2009).  
As described by Doyle & Bennett (1999, 2002) (and the commander himself, 
Hamilton 1920) the Allied commander rejected both Bulair and the Asiatic shore 
as main landing sites, due to the strength of the enemy positions there and the in-
creased proximity of Ottoman troops. Instead, a concentration of effort was to be 
made in the southwestern part of the peninsula, the intention being the capture the 
Kilid Bahr Plateau, which overlooked the main fort of the same name, and the nar-
rows of the Dardanelles. This, it was hoped, would achieve the main objectives of 
the landing, the support of naval operations. Suvla Bay was ruled out as it was too 
far away from the Kilid Bahr Plateau to be of value, and because there was little 
reliable information about its terrain characteristics. The main landings were 
therefore to be made at the southern end of the Peninsula at Cape Helles, and on 
the west coast at Gaba Tepe, in what would become known as the ANZAC Sector 
(Fig. 1.1). 
The German commander of the Ottoman troops, General Liman von Sanders 
considered the most likely landing places to be Bulair and the Anatolian Coast; the 
former because of its strategic position in controlling the neck of the peninsula, 
the latter because of the possibility provided by its relatively wide beaches. It was 
for this reason that he created heavily fortified positions in these areas. Von Sand-
ers also realised the threat from attacks at Gaba Tepe and Cape Helles; the former 
because of the low ground crossing the peninsula between the Sari Bair and Kilid 
Bahr plateaux, threatening Maidos, the latter because of the long slope up from the 
beaches to the peak of Achi Baba which could easily be threatened by naval gun-
fire. Not surprisingly, all of these areas were protected by extensive trenches and 
barbed wire entanglements in the month preceding the Allied landings in 1915 
(Aspinall-Oglander 1929; Rhodes James 1965; Doyle & Bennett 1999, 2002; 
Travers 2001; Chasseaud & Doyle 2004; Prior 2009; Doyle 2011).  
The Cape Helles landings were made by the men of the British 29th Division at 
five beaches, code lettered S, V, W, X, Y. The landings at S, X and Y were virtu-
ally unopposed, but due to poor communications, the tactical advantages of the 
situation were not exploited. The landings at V and W met fierce opposition from 
the Turks in their well-prepared positions (Aspinall-Oglander 1929; Rhodes James 
1965; Doyle 2008). The landings north of Gaba Tepe at Z beach were to be made 
by the men of the ANZAC Corps. They were to be beached from towed open 
boats commanded by junior naval officers who had orders to stay in set positions 
as they approached the shore. Constant readjustment to retain these positions, and 
a gradual northwards drift, meant that the troops landed at the northern extremity 
of the beaches, a feature that has received much comment and discussion (e.g. see 
Aspinall-Oglander 1929; Rhodes James 1965; Carlyon 2003; Doyle 2011). In fact, 
the landing zone was not as tightly constrained as has been previously discussed 
(see Prior 2009 for discussion), and the landings were actually spread out along 
the beach, in front of what would become known as Plugge’s Plateau, and close to 
the small cove, now known as Anzac Cove. 
After 25 April 1915, the ‘Battle of the Beaches’, static trench positions similar 
to those of the Western Front developed. In the ANZAC Sector, the Allied objec-
tives were the summit of the Sari Bair ridge, though some troops did manage to 
reach the subsidiary peak of Chunuk Bair in the opening days of the campaign. 
Very quickly the ANZAC troops became committed to static trench warfare, alt-
hough some actions, such as the battles for the Lone Pine and the Nek in August 
of the same year, gained legendary status in Australia and New Zealand. However, 
throughout the campaign the troops at ANZAC were in a very difficult position, 
cramped by the narrowness of the beach and hemmed in by the precipitous slopes.  
Following the failure of the summer offensives (Crawley 2014), and the re-
placement of General Sir Ian Hamilton as Allied Commander, it realised by his 
replacement, Sir Charles Munro, that it would be impossible to sustain the cam-
paign, break the stalemate, and achieve the strategic objectives without a signifi-
cant diversion of men and resources away from the Western Front. For these rea-
sons, first a partial, and then a complete, withdrawal were planned. These took 
place, with complete success and few casualties, in December 1915 and January 
1916.  
Geological setting of the Gallipoli Peninsula 
Doyle (1999, 2002, 2008) has provided an overview of the geology and topo-
graphical features of Gallipoli, which is the basis, together with the available geo-
logical map (Ternek et al. 1987) for this summary. The Gallipoli Peninsula forms 
part of the Alpine Pontide range, with a strong east-west structural grain, and 
comprises ancient crystalline massifs developed in Anatolia, and folded Mesozo-
ic-Cenozoic sediments in Thrace and basement margins of Anatolia. The most 
dominant feature is the North Anatolian Fault zone, separating the European and 
Anatolian plates, which runs under the Sea of Marmara and crosses the Peninsula 
to the Gulf of Saros, forming the northern, rifted and strongly rectilinear margin of 
the peninsula and the Dardanelles Straits, and separating it from the rest of Thrace. 
This fault zone has predominantly strike-slip movement, and is complex, as other 
branches of it form the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara, and is still active to-
day. During the Neogene fault movement developed a trans-tensional basin and 
produced the Sea of Marmara, with a maximum depth of 1000 metres, and led to 
the deposition of the thick Neogene sediments on either side of the Dardanelles. 
The Gallipoli Peninsula is therefore mostly composed of Palaeogene and Neogene 
sediments in a simple, relatively undisturbed relationship (Fig. 1.2). The oldest 
Palaeogene beds consist of Middle and Upper Eocene sediments that form the 
northern coast of the Peninsula. These Eocene beds are succeeded by continental 
Oligocene deposits, followed by marine sediments of Miocene age. Continental 
Pliocene caps most of the upland areas, and Quaternary alluvium and related sed-
iments are found in valleys. It is these Pliocene–Quaternary rocks that were to 
have a major impact on the development of the Gallipoli Campaign at ANZAC. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.2  The basic geology of the Gallipoli Peninsula, showing the Miocene soft sediments cap-
ping the Sari Bair range at Anzac. (Based on illustration in Doyle and Bennett 1999)  
Relief 
The relief of the southern part of the Gallipoli Peninsula is relatively subdued, 
with a series of ridges in the north and two northeast-southwest trending plateaux 
in the south (Fig. 1.2). The southern plateaux are formed from Pliocene sediments, 
overlying bedded Miocene limestones. The margins of the plateaux are heavily 
dissected, forming a complex network of sharp-crested interfluves. In most cases 
the slopes are vegetated with scrub, but where the slopes are marked, there is ac-
tive downcutting and erosion, creating a heavily dissected ‘badland’, typical of ar-
id environments with soft, easily eroded sediments. The northern margin of the 
Sari Bair plateau is marked by a fault line scarp, and this is indicative of the active 
nature of the uplift caused by movement along the North Anatolian Fault Zone, it-
self exacerbating the erosion. Beneath the steep upper face of the scarp the slopes 
are heavily gullied and are barren of vegetation, forming classic ‘badland’ topog-
raphy. In the southeastern part of the peninsula, the slopes of the Kilid Bahr Mas-
sif are strongly gullied, in some cases forming deep ravines. These ravines exploit 
the structural grain of the Peninsula, to give a parallel-alignment to the drainage of 
the southern peninsula.  
The majority of rivers within the southern Gallipoli Peninsula are seasonal, and 
most valleys are dry for much of the year. Exceptions occur in the northern part of 
the study area, on the margins of the Suvla Plain, where there are some perennial 
streams. All the major lithological units have potential as aquifers. However, it is 
clear from studies of Neogene and younger sediments on the southern margin of 
the Dardanelles that the main aquifer potential lies with the Miocene limestones 
and the Quaternary alluvial deposits. 
The ANZAC landings, 25 April 1915 
The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps  were to be landed at the beach (‘Z’ 
Beach) north of Gaba Tepe (Fig. 1.1), facing the formidable, dissected landscape 
of the Sari Bair Range. The range terminated to the northwest, its steep face creat-
ed by the actions of fractures in the underlying soils, part of the same fault system 
that had created the Dardanelles. The underlying rocks were easily eroded from 
fluvial action and intermittent rainfall over centuries producing a rugged land-
scape. The vegetation consists of a low, unforgiving scrub; with rough and easily 
disturbed soils, resulting in little flat ground.  
Behind ‘Z’ Beach (soon to be dubbed Brighton Beach after its namesake in 
Melbourne, Australia), three parallel ridges (first, second and third) seemed to 
provide the best means of assaulting the peak in the initial stages of the operation. 
These ridges are a function of the activity of the North Anatolian Fault system, 
and mirror the structural grain of the Peninsula. If the ANZACS could get ashore 
in this inhospitable place, then they could clamber up the slopes that led to Second 
Ridge; moving through the scrub along the ridge, where they would be in a posi-
tion to ‘take the high ground’ and dominate the ridge top. From here there would 
be views across Suvla Bay and its plain to the northwest, and back down to the 
southeast in the direction of Helles. ‘Z’ Beach (between Gaba Tepe and Ari 
Burnu) was to be assaulted by the Anzacs at one hour before dawn, in an effort to 
maximize surprise, and to try and reach the first positions before daybreak. Three 
battalions of the Australian 3rd Brigade (together with supporting troops) would 
lead the assault landed from seven destroyers, which were to approach close in to 
the beach. The main force would land from transports (Aspinall-Oglander 1929; 
Rhodes James 1965; Travers 2001; Carlyon 2003; Prior 2003; Doyle 2011). 
With the three ridges leading to the summit of the Sari Bair Range (Fig. 1.3) as 
the target, and Second Ridge just behind the beach, the 3rd Brigade was ordered 
advance over its slopes, thereby gaining – and holding Third Ridge. Following on 
closely, the Australian 2nd Brigade, would then be in a position to advance up the 
ridge, taking the nearest summits, Chunuk Bair at the flat plateau top joined by the 
three ridges, and ‘Scrubby Knoll’ a prominent feature on Third Ridge. The main 
force would then arrive to press on to a hill known as Mal Tepe, on the Darda-
nelles side of the Peninsula – which, it was hoped, would serve as a strong point 
that would help secure the Dardanelles defences. In taking the ridge tops, the AN-
ZACs hoped to be able to deny them to the enemy – and ultimately link up with 
the British advancing from Cape Helles to conquer the northern shore of the Dar-
danelles and silence the guns. 
 
 
Fig. 1.3 The 1908 map, showing the continuous nature of First Ridge, a feature found to be im-
passable on 25 April 1915. The location of the Second and Third ridges, and the summit of the 
Sari Bair Plateau, is marked  
Gaining the shore at about 4.30 am, the Australians struggled up the shingle 
beach in their combat equipment. The water was deeper than expected as the sol-
diers leaped out of the boats; several must have been dragged under. Ahead of 
them were unfamiliar slopes that would lead up to the top of Sari Bair. Small arms 
fire was directed at them by the Ottoman defenders. It was heaviest at the northern 
part – the promontory known as Ari Burnu, and close to the small ramshackle 
building known as Fisherman’s Hut. But this was not the only resistance facing 
the Australians. In front of them were the first slopes that they knew would lead 
up to the top of the Sari Bair range. The Australian battalions struggled to the top 
of a slope vegetated with thick scrub that was later to be called Plugge’s Plateau – 
a small flat-topped extension of what was the First Ridge (Fig. 1.3). They were 
unable to push on – confronting them was a bald, narrow ridge that the forces of 
nature had eroded from both sides – the Razor Edge. This was to be impassable; 
north of this feature was a forbidding bowl of bare earth that sat at the foot of what 
the soldiers (in memory of their time in Egypt), would later call ‘The Sphinx’. 
This steep-sided cliff, part of Walker’s Ridge, that had been created by the erosion 
of a particularly hard band of cemented conglomerate that was resistant to weath-
ering. This was in contrast to most of the Sari Bair Range, made up of fine Mio-
cene sediments that were easily eroded by both wind and water action, creating a 
myriad of gullies, sharp spurs and innumerable dead-ends. Devoid of much water, 
these soils promoted the growth of stunted bushes and shrubs. The Razor’s Edge 
came as a complete surprise to the Australians. The 1908 vintage map supplied to 
the troops indicated a continuous ridge that could be easily traversed (Fig. 1.3). 
This was not to be the case, and became a major point of contention in post-war 
discussions of terrain intelligence failure, starting with the British Official History 
(Aspinall-Oglander 1929; see Chasseaud & Doyle 2004). 
 For the men landing north of Ari Burnu, not only would the harsh terrain of 
the Sphinx and Walker’s Ridge be in their way, so would the fire of the defending 
Ottomans at Fisherman’s Hut. The next wave of men came ashore from the boats 
also released by the seven destroyers standing off the coast. Now daylight, the 
boats were more spread out, delivering men onto a beach that was in the order of 
1500 yards wide, part of them to the north of Ari Burnu, the remainder to the 
south. By 4.45 am, some 4000 men of the ANZAC covering force were released 
into the confusing and inhospitable badland landscape of the sector – much easier 
to defend than attack. Under attack from the defenders in the north, and facing un-
certain terrain in front of them, it was difficult to know in what direction they 
should press ahead. Led my officers as unsure of the terrain as their men, the AN-
ZACs scrambled through the unforgiving terrain towards their target, Hill 971 and 
‘Baby 700’ at the junction of the three main ridges. 
The remainder of the Australian troops began landing from the transports at 
5.30 am, the press of men adding to the confusion of those already onshore. As 
they advanced farther up the coast past Ari Burnu and Walker’s Ridge, and close 
to the ‘Fisherman’s Hut’, the ANZAC troops were once more engaged by the Ot-
toman defenders – at a high cost to the attackers. Men from the second wave were 
pressed into the attack. The commander of the Covering Force was aware that he 
had to press on from the beaches to capture the Third Ridge (Fig. 1.3), hold it and 
force his troops on to the high ground. Yet with passing time, the cohesion of his 
fighting units was breaking down, and it was difficult to identify just who was 
where, with small groups of men engaged in their own battles with the landscape. 
It was more realistic to try and concentrate on Second Ridge, securing its length 
from close to Hell Spit, at the southern end of Anzac Cove, upwards from the 
beach until the ridge coalesced with the great mass of summit of the Sari Bair 
Range. Though some scouts had reached Scrubby Knoll at around 9.00 am, briefly 
viewing the Narrows in the distance, they soon had to withdraw. No other AN-
ZACs would stand on the knoll during the war.  
With Third Ridge seemingly out of his grasp, the ANZAC commander directed 
his forces to form strong posts along the edge of the Second Ridge, posts that 
would hold throughout the campaign (soon to become named after their com-
manders – ‘Courtney’s’, ‘Steele’s’ and ‘Quinn’s’; Fig. 1.4). Baby 700, sat at the 
junction of Second Ridge with the main mass of the mountain, would also have to 
be held. Not for the last time, the deep, scrub-filled gully that divided the First 
from the Second Ridges, Monash Valley, would serve as a route towards the apex 
of the ANZAC line. The line would also have to hold across the broader expanse 
of the 400 Plateau, a wider area on Second Ridge covered in dense scrub. (The 
eastern part of the Plateau, soon to be christened ‘Lone Pine’ after its single pine 
tree, was to see some of the bloodiest hand-to-hand fighting of the whole cam-
paign, in August). 
 
  
Fig. 1.4   Stalemate at Anzac: the relatively static trench lines, defining the most dissected part of 
the Sari Bair range. (Map from Callwell 1929)  
On Second Ridge, a flat plateau that was the scene of fierce fighting within the 
scrub vegetation in the first hours of the campaign, still presented difficulties. At-
tack and counterattack followed each other over possession of Baby 700. Holding 
out until 4.00 pm, the ANZAC line finally broke, the hill lost, when the Ottomans 
made a concerted effort to drive them from it. With the benefit of artillery support 
(naval gunfire in this opening part of the campaign), the ANZAC line melted 
away, its survivors streaming back over the narrow saddle of land that connected 
First Ridge with the plateau top. 
As night descended on the scene, both defenders and attackers were in a peri-
lous state. The line was held in an arc rising from the beach along Second Ridge 
(leading to 400 Plateau) through the isolated posts (Steele’s, Courtney’s and 
Quinn’s) to the head of Monash Gully; from there it descended down to the sea on 
the other side of the Sphinx, along Walker’s Ridge. The front line formed an arc 
of rilled and gullied ground, just less than one and a half miles in length, its great-
est penetration amounting to no more than a mile. Having landed and dug-in, the 
ANZACs were now told to wait events, and hold the line. In total, 15,000 ANZAC 
troops had landed; but there were now 2,000 dead and wounded, with the living 
crowded into open boats waiting to be re-embarked.  
Trench warfare 
With the landings stalemated, came the onset of trench warfare (Fig. 1.4). Making 
the best of it, the Australians and New Zealanders fell into a routine that would 
ensure their part of the line was protected from Ottoman attacks. Everywhere in 
the frontline the conditions were poor. The relatively soft Pliocene sediments ena-
bled the relatively rapid development of rudimentary trench systems, although this 
was hampered in the opening hours of the campaign by an absence of adequate 
construction tools, and by the degree of root penetration. By the end of the cam-
paign, the trench systems were complex with a parallel underground system of 
tunnels and saps. In addition, many terraces were cut in the reverse slope to pro-
vide rudimentary dwelling areas (Aspinall-Oglander 1932; Rhodes James 1965; 
Carlyon 2003; Stanley 2005).  
In general, few drainage problems were encountered early in the campaign, 
given the paucity of rainfall, in the summer months at least, the relative permeabil-
ity of the trenches, and the depth to the water table. Trench construction was nev-
ertheless an important consideration for the military engineers. Revetment was 
usually achieved using locally derived or shipped in timber, and both sides used 
covered trench systems, roofed by timber baulks and earthworks, in order to miti-
gate against the effects of shrapnel and small arms fire, although largely useless 
against direct hits from high explosive shells. Covered trench systems were creat-
ed and there was extensive use of loopholes for snipers. New trenches were often 
dug by the use of shallow tunnels, which were then roofed with timber before 
loopholes were cut (Aspinall-Oglander 1932; Prior 2009).  
As with the Western Front, dugouts at Gallipoli varied from the deep, shell-
proof dugout to the shallow recess or ‘funk-hole’ intended only as a limited shelter 
(Doyle and Bennett 1999). Extensive dugout systems were cut into the seawards 
slopes of the Sari Bair Plateau providing shelter for a variety of administrative and 
service personnel. These were linked to the beaches by transport routes along gul-
lies on the scarp slope of the plateau in the ANZAC Sector. Transport routes to the 
beaches were hazardous; here Monash Gully, leading to Shrapnel Gully, was be 
developed as a transport thoroughfare, with pack animals moving to and fro (Fig. 
1.4). 
While ostensibly static, the frontline trenches were actually alive with activity. 
In an echo of ancient siege warfare, mines were dug by both sides beneath each 
other’s forward trenches, in order that explosives could be placed to destroy the 
trenches above (Aspinal-Oglander 1932; Branagan, 1987; Stanley 2005; Prior 
2009). Mining was also used for the construction of dugouts intended as dressing 
stations, operating theatres, headquarters and for other uses (Fig. 1.5). Harder 
conglomeratic levels (such as that at ‘The Sphinx’ were exploited as mine gallery 
roofs, though were hard to cut down through (Fig. 1.6). Nevertheless, mines were 
dug throughout the frontlines, but perhaps none so much as at Quinn’s Post (Stan-
ley 2005), at the head of Monash Gully, the main supply line (Fig. 1.5). It was de-
scribed by some as the key position at Anzac: 
 
  
Fig. 1.5   A contemporary map of mining activity close to Quinn’s Post, ANZAC Sector, 1915  
   
Fig. 1.6  Harder conglomeratic levels within the sediments at Anzac, here helping to form the 
distinctive feature known as ‘The Sphinx’, the main flank of which is illustrated  
 
Quinn’s had a fatal fascination for the Turk. Quinn’s was a position that was to be held at 
all cost; with limited space, a complex terrace had to be constructed to its rear in order to 
provide sufficient room to create adequate fire and communication trenches. During May 
the enemy commenced mining in earnest, and this was a serious menace to the safety of 
the ANZAC area. Successful underground operations by the enemy would mean that 
Quinn’s might slide down into Monash Gully, so vigorous countermining was resorted to. 
The object of this countermining was to get under or near the opponent’s drives [tunnels], 
and destroy them by means of small charges. Major Fred Waite, NZ Engineers (Waite 
1921). 
Water supply was a major pre-occupation in the ANZAC Sector, as elsewhere 
on the peninsula, though the combination of geological circumstances discussed 
above meant that it was perhaps more acute here. The German commander, Lin-
man von Sanders considered that one of the most decisive factors responsible for 
the Turkish success was the availability of water behind their lines (Hamilton 
1920; Nevinson 1920; Aspinall-Oglander 1932; Doyle & Bennett 1999, 2002; 
Prior 2009); something that was lacking for the Allies One of the biggest issues 
was a lack of reliable groundwater supplies in the ANZAC Sector. Here, the main 
limestone aquifer found in the southern peninsula (Fig. 1.2) was at depth, overlain 
by largely dry sediments. Some water supplies were found perched on impermea-
ble strata, but were difficult to accurately locate (Beeby-Thomson 1924). Some 
seasonal exploitation of water courses in the Sector was theoretically possible, but 
like the perched sources were ephemeral. Many of the wells dug in the surround-
ing gullies began to dry up with the approach of summer, and though others were 
found at depth. This meant that the daily ration from local sources in the 1st Aus-
tralian Division was rarely more than one third of a gallon per man; today, in arid 
conditions, two gallons might be expected for combat effectiveness (Anon 2012). 
Most water supplies for these areas was from imported water (Aspinall-Oglander 
1929, 1932), and the large water-lighters used had to be towed from Alexandria 
and Malta and moored alongside the piers at Anzac Cove. The water could then be 
pumped by hand into iron tanks on the beach, whence it was taken by mules to 
other tanks in the hills, and thence by hand to the troops holding the line.  
Later, a pumping plant and a number of larger storage tanks were obtained 
from Egypt. These were hauled to specially constructed platforms on the slopes of 
Plugge’s Plateau, Walkers Ridge and other points near the front line. They were 
connected to the beach, and thereafter water could be pumped straight into them 
from the lighters, and then distributed to smaller tanks by gravitation (Aspinall-
Oglander 1932, p. 117).  
As to water, that element of itself was responsible for a whole chapter of preparations. An 
enormous quantity had to be collected secretly, and as secretly stowed away at Anzac, 
where a high-level reservoir had to be built, having a holding capacity of 30,000 gallons, 
and fitted out with a regular system of pipes and distribution tanks. A stationary engine 
was brought over from Egypt to fill that reservoir. Petroleum tins, with a carrying 
capacity of 80,000 gallons, were got together, and fixed up with handles, etc. General Sir 
Ian Hamilton (1920). 
Discussion 
The geological and topographical issues of the ANZAC Sector were extremely 
challenging. The ANZACs were committed here in April 1915 as with their ‘Co-
lonial experience’ in Australia it felt that they might be best suited to the terrain. 
That terrain was broken, gullied and rilled, the result of millennia of fluvial ero-
sion of weak Pliocene sediments – held up here and there by more coherent beds 
of conglomeratic material, creating a feature named by the ANZAC troops as the 
Sphinx (Fig. 1.6). Such hard bands could be breached, however, and such breach-
es meant that potential routes, such as that presented tantalisingly, but erroneous-
ly, by the 1908 topographical map (Fig. 1.3), were reduced to razor-sharp ridges 
with precipitous drops. This has been argued as being a significant factor in the 
failure to make progress to the top of Sari Bair on the first day; though there are 
other reasons, such as lack of experience of the attacking troops (Aspinall-
Oglander 1929; Rhodes James 1965; Travers 2001; Carlyon 2003; Prior 2009). 
The challenging nature of the terrain also meant that communication between 
the attacking troops was reduced, and that the momentum of the attackers was eas-
ily spent. This resulted in the Australian and New Zealand troops establishing a 
front line that was to cling to the seaward side of the Sari Bair scarp, but would 
not reach the ridge tops. This line formed an arc that was difficult to break out 
from, and which was difficult to fortify and defend. The defensive line thus creat-
ed was actually series of outposts; outposts that would require considerable engi-
neering effort to extend and fortify. It also meant that artillery fire up towards the 
Ottoman lines was limited in its effectiveness; the ANZACs were mostly only 
equipped with low trajectory field guns that would have difficulty sighting their 
enemy – or use naval guns from off shore. Mine warfare would be resorted to by 
both sides. 
Like most other problems, supply issues were magnified at Anzac; all men and 
materiel would have to travel up the gullies that led to the front line, up Shrapnel 
and Monash gullies to Quinn’s and other fortified positions. Water in particular 
was a considerable issue, especially so since there was no opportunity to exploit 
aquifers, and that water had to be derived from the beach, imported from Egypt. It 
was these issues, as much as the failure to exploit early momentum, that would see 
the failure of the campaign at Anzac, and that would see the withdrawal in De-
cember. It would also ensure that the battles of August, intended to break out of 
the ANZAC Sector would be the bloodiest of the campaign, and would still not 
create the desired result – the break through that would silence the guns of the 
Dardanelles, remove the threat of the minefields, and allow the Allied ships 
through. The terrain had significantly impeded the ANZACs at Gallipoli, an un-
fortunate accident of geography bringing the least favourable geology of the 
whole peninsula – Miocene–Pliocene sediments that tended to badlands – to the 
very spot where the Anzacs would land and attempt to prosecute their war against 
the Ottomans. 
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